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ABSTRACT
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for more than 25 years. Its member nations, (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have emphasized the role of the association
as a neutral organization based on co-operation among members in the spirit of
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which can contribute to building the foundation of peace, stability, and prosperity
in the ASEAN region in particular and the world in general.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this
thesis will try to examine the relevance of the ASEAN's original intention in the
formation of the organization. With the uncertainty of the US military presence
in the region, Japan's growing military capabilities, China's continuous military
modernization, and other developments in the region, is it necessary for the
ASEAN to be transformed into a defense and security alliance? Is the ASEAN
capable of forming a military defense pact? Finally, this thesis will examine the
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The Cold War created various bipolar security structures.
Many of the nations of the world were divided between the
rival camps and identified themselves with either of the two
opposing ideologies, communism in the east and capitalism in
the west. These arrangements created a military balance of
power, and deterrence between the east and the west, which
prevented the eruption of a war between the superpowers. The
absence of a hegemonic war led to a degree of de facto order
in the Cold War international system. This did very little,
however, to prevent serious regional conflict from erupting
outside Europe and North America. The United States, the
former Soviet Union, and China, the so-called Great Powers,
have projected their rivalries to the Third World by
supporting local conflicts. Superpower tensions fueled and
exacerbated these conflicts. The dangers of superpower
confrontation were diverted to isolated Third World countries,
transforming them into battle fields; this safeguarded the
home territories of the superpowers. This is evident in that
all the major conflicts after World War II have occurred in
Third World countries.
The superpowers transformed local and regional problems
into international incidents, thereby making the actors in the
local conflicts dependent upon the Great Powers. Settlement of
these regional and local conflicts has depended on the consent
of these powers. The security and stability of the Third World
nations and their respective regions rely heavily on the
support of these powerful states.
With the end of the Cold War and the cessation of the
Sino- Soviet -American contention, the concern of some smaller
states about the domination of their foreign and defense
policies by their benefactors has somewhat diminished. They no
longer need to shelter under the wings of the great states as
the price of alliance. However, on the negative side, the end
of the Cold War also has ended superpower over the use of
modern armaments by Third World countries . During the Cold War
the Great powers transferred large quantities of modern
armaments to sustain their allies. This caused regional arms
races which continued after the Cold War, fostering
instability in various regions. With the diminishment of
superpower influence, regional states must now confront
domestic conflicts on their own and either defer, resolve, or
possibly go to war over these conflicts.
The United Nations Organization (UN), to some extent,
helped in the settlement of these local conflicts. However,
the UN could not have been successful without the approval of
the Security Council, where all the superpowers are permanent
members with veto powers. The participation of the United
Nations in the Korean War and the Gulf War of 1991 would not
have succeeded without the full support of the United States
and the non-interference of the former Soviet Union. At times
the views of the great powers in the United Nations were not
consistent with the culture and interests of the conflicting
Third World parties. This frequently exacerbates the
situation, as shown in Somalia, Rwanda and other conflicts in
developing countries.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, there was optimism that the incidence of local
conflicts would greatly decrease. This proved to be
unwarranted. The events in Europe, such as Bosnia, Moldova,
and Ossetia; the problems with the former Soviet Union's
republics; Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, and Western Sahara
in Africa; Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula in Eastern Asia,
cumulatively demonstrated that military conflict and its
consequences appear just as endemic today as they were during
the Cold War. This may prevail for the foreseeable future.
This also is evident by the rapid increase in the
frequency and type of peace -keeping operations that the United
Nations has undertaken. " Since its (UN) intense mediation of
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the
Iran- Iraq War, the United Nations has mounted thirteen new
operations, the same number as in the previous forty years. In
the first few months of 1992 alone, some 30,000 soldiers have
been added to the UN payroll with the massive new undertaking
in Yugoslavia and Cambodia." 1
Against the background of the uncertainty of the United
Nations success in settling international conflicts, the
elimination of the Soviet power, and apprehension about the
future of the continued presence of US forward forces, a major
question now arises as to the need for a regional organization
to settle disputes that are regional in scope. UN observers
have argued that the United Nations has overstretched its
capacity to handle certain crises and that the financial
burden of getting involved in all conflicts is too great for
the United Nations. For these reasons, this author believes
that a regional organization such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , is better equipped to handle
the dynamics of regional conflict resolution.
The end of the Cold War removed the integrating external
factors and increased the discontinuity between the global
system and regional subsystems. With internal economic
problems and increasing resource constraints, the major powers
may no longer have the capacity or the interest to get
involved in regional conflicts as they did in the past.
Getting regional organizations involved in conflict
resolution will also ease the overloaded burden
'. MacFarlane, Neil and Weiss, T. G. , "Regional
Organizations and Regional Security", Regional Security .
Edited by John Arquilla, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, 1994
responsibilities borne by the cash-strapped UN. As stated by
the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
:
In this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements
or agencies can render great service... the Security
Council has and will continue to have the primary
responsibility of maintaining peace and security, but
regional action as a matter of decentralization,
delegation and cooperation with the United Nations
could not only lighten the burden of the Council, but
also contribute to a deeper sense of participation,




If regional organizations address the regional problems of
the Third World states, it will give them the opportunity to
have greater control over their environment. As Richard Taylor
observed, it also will give them "a chance to develop their
growing political maturity and economy. An opportunity to
mitigate their disadvantaged position in the international
system. " 3
This does not mean, however, that regional organizations
should be formed throughout the globe and try to settle all
international crises. This thesis limits its consideration of
the applicability and effectiveness of regional organizations
in the region of Southeast Asia through the Association of
the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
.
2
. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, UN Secretary-General, An
Agenda for Peace and Peace -Keeping . United Nations, New York,
1992, pp. 36-37.
3
. Taylor, R. , Regionalism: The Thoughts and the Deeds,
The Framework for International Relations
. St Martin Press,
New York, 1990, p. 164.
II. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. DEFINITION
There are no absolute or naturally determined
regions. Relevant geographical boundaries vary
with different purpose; for example, a
relevant region for security may not be one
for economic integration. 4
The Cold War and its bipolar arrangements demonstrated
that regionalism can be based on many factors aside from
geographic proximity. Functions and purpose are the key
factors in the formation of regional organizations. The
Organizations of Islamic Countries (OIC) was organized due to
the commonality of religion, the European Economic Council
(EEC) and North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA) were
formed for the trade and economic considerations of
neighboring states, while the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) was established to maintain security and
defense. Even within the realm of defense, organizations
differ in their perceptions of the ways defense arrangements
may be implemented. They include: collective security,
collective self-defense, security regimes, and a security
community.
4
. Nye, Joseph, S., International Regionalism , Little
Brown and Company, Boston, Mass., 1968, p. 76.
Collective Security was the term given to the system for
2 maintenance of international peace that was supposed to
place the balance of power system after the Second World
|. The United Nations system for maintaining international
ace and security is a clear example of a collective security
ructure. Collective self-defense refers to military
Liances as provided for in Article 51 of the United Nations
irter. This is aimed at the containment of global or
stemic- level security threats, such as international
nmunism or capitalism. These regional organizations are
cen dominated by global powers, like the North Atlantic
aaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, both of which
re controlled by superpowers. A Security community refers to
group of states that has become militarily and otherwise
:egrated. Usually, there is real assurance that the members
the community will not fight each other physically but will
;tle their disputes in some other way. This type of system
solely controlled by its member- states . Good examples are
i Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
janization of African Unity (OAU) . At the end of the Cold
:, these organizations are considered examples of indigenous
burity regionalism, and they appear to be gaining
eminence. A Security regime refers to the principles, rules
and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their
behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. 5
The types of conflicts existing within a given region
generally determine the role and the effectiveness of a
regional organization. Conflicts may be classified into four
types. There are intrastate conflicts, which refers to
disputes within a single state; and intramural conflicts
which involve conflicts among member states. There also are
external conflicts which involve regional states that are not
members of the regional organization, while extra- regional
conflicts involve actors that are external to the region.
B. ROLES AND STRATEGIES
Regional security organizations have three basic roles:
conflict prevention, conflict containment and conflict
termination. It is the function of the organization to
influence the interests and capabilities of the member states.
The ability of the organization to carry out these functions
will determine its effectiveness and limitations.
In the conflict prevention mode, the role of the regional
organization is to foresee conflict and to prevent outbreaks
of hostilities or any form of disruptive behavior. Disruptive
behavior may mean the overt use of force and other forceful
5
. Alagappa, Muthiah, "Regionalism and the Quest for
Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict", Journal of
International Affairs , Columbia University, New York, 1993,
pp. 442-443.
actions for the purpose of compelling a state to alter or
abandon its position through the use of coercive political,
diplomatic and economic measures. The preventive role requires
redefinition of the interests and capabilities of the
concerned states which may be achieved through assigning
property rights, providing information, altering the patterns
of transaction costs, as well as altering the underlying power
capabilities of states through collective action. 6
Strategies of socialization, integration, reassurance and
deterrence are relevant to the conflict prevention role.
Socialization can contribute to the construction of security
regimes, while integration can foster the development of a
security community and minimize or eliminate security problems
created when little is known of the security capabilities and
preparedness of neighboring parties. Reassurance and
deterrence strategies are critical in preventing the outbreak
of war, both intended and unintended.
In its role in conflict containment, the task of a
regional security organization is to deny victory to the
aggressor and to prevent the spread of conflict. Denial of
victory includes stopping the aggressor short of attaining his
full goal. It may also include reversing past gains.
Preventing the spread of conflict includes stopping horizontal
escalation in which other countries and other issue areas
6
. Mitchel, C. R.
,
The Structures of International
Conflicts , St Martin Press, New York, 1981, p. 171.
become involved. Prevention may also be directed toward
halting the vertical escalation of conflict up the ladder of
violence, possibly including the use of weapons of mass
destruction.
In the containment of conflict mode, a regional
organization may use either isolation or intervention in the
crisis. Isolation means providing a cordon sa.nita.ire to
prevent vertical and horizontal escalation of the conflict,
allowing time and opportunity for the competing actors to
resolve the conflict bilaterally. Isolation is a passive form
of involvement, avoiding a partisan role.
In intervention, direct and active involvement through the
coercive application of collective political, economic, and
military resources are utilized by the organization to
terminate the conflict. There are four types of intervention:
collective security, collective self-defense, coercive
diplomacy, and peacekeeping. In collective security,
intervention is undertaken to enforce the security system of
the regional organization in a conflict among member- states,
and sometimes in intrastate conflicts. This type of
intervention is normally conducted by the UN and only with the
concurrence of the Security Council. In collective self-
defense, the regional organization confronts an aggressor on
the battlefield. A security alliance among the member- states
is necessary for this kind of intervention. Coercive diplomacy
is used to affect the aggressor's will rather than his
10
capability. Political, economic and military pressure is
applied to wear down the adversary, forcing him to alter his
intentions and agree to a mutually acceptable resolution of
the conflict. Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is used to
facilitate mediation efforts by interposing neutral forces
between opposing forces thus preventing further fighting.
In the conflict termination mode, the task of a regional
security organization is to halt and bring hostilities to a
satisfactory conclusion through a resolution or settlement. A
satisfactory conclusion from the perspective of the regional
organization may include defeating the aggressor and
reestablishing the status quo, achieving a compromise, or
removing the source of conflict. Conflict settlement focuses
on achieving an agreement to end the use of violence and
resolve the more immediate and overt dimension of the
conflict. Conflict resolution seeks to remove the source of
conflict, which requires changes in the goals, attitudes and
perceptions of the conflicting parties. 7
C. FORMER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1 . SEATO
The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was
based on the Manila Pact, a Southeast Asian collective
7
. Ned Lebow, Richard and Stein, Janice., "Beyond
Deterrence"' Journal of Social Justice . Issue 43, No. 4, 1987,
pp. 65-71.
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security treaty, created by the United States in 1954 in
response to the growing concern over the expansion of
communism in Southeast Asia. It was patterned after the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) , which was created in 1954
as a defense alliance. The difference between the two
organizations, however, was that NATO had a standing force
while SEATO had only a military planning office. In SEATO,
only two member states were from southeast Asia, Thailand and
the Philippines. The rest were mostly major powers, including
the United States, Great Britain, and France. Pakistan was
also a member because of East Pakistan. When Bangladesh
attained her independence in 19 71, Pakistan withdrew from the
organization.
SEATO failed primarily because there was too great a
diversity of interests among the western states and even
between the Asian nations. The two nations from Southeast Asia
(the Philippines and Thailand) joined the organization because
of their bilateral defense treaties with the United States.
Other nations in the region viewed the creation of the
organization as a imperialist venture that was designed to
control the region. This was particularly true of Indonesia,
which believed that the region should be free from the
influence of great powers. The United Kingdom lost its concern
with the organization after the independence of Malaysia and
Singapore. The British then revived the Five Power Defense
Agreement (FPDA) with Australia and New Zealand in 1966.
12
France withdrew its financial support for SEATO after its
failure in Indochina in the mid fifties. This left the United
States as SEATO' s sole supporter. 8
2 . MAPHILINDO
The MAPHILINDO was the acronym given to the three
Malay states that attempted to form a "Greater Malay
Confederation" in the early 60s. Malaysia, the Philippines and
Indonesia formed the confederation to address territorial
disputes derived from their colonial legacies. Malaysia and
the Philippines struggled over the state of Sabah, while
Indonesia and Malaysia experienced tensions over Sarawak. The
confederation was short lived because the parties could not
agree on the objectives of the organization and were
confrontational on the territorial issues. The region was on
the verge of war. A third party, or an extra- regional actor
with no interest on the conflicts was necessary to mediate the
disputes. No major power would intervene because it was very
unlikely that the United States and Great Britain would want
to jeopardize their relationships in the region over Third
World territorial disputes. With the vigorous mediation of
Thailand and an effort to have a single organization in
Southeast Asia, MAPHILINDO was later integrated to the
inactive Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)
.
8
. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate





The Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) was composed of
Australia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and South Vietnam. It was
created in June of 1966 in Seoul, South Korea, primarily to
check the escalating war in Vietnam. One of its main
objectives was to safeguard their national independence and
integrity against any Communist aggression. It also served as
a consultative association to foster political, economic,
cultural, and social cooperation. It aimed at assisting the
mutual development of its members' national economies. The
organization did not last long because many leaders believed
that China should have been included instead of Taiwan, a view
which antagonized many Asian nations. ASPAC was never formally
terminated, but has ceased to meet since the fall of South
Vietnam.
4. ASA
The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was organized
in Bangkok, Thailand in July of 1961 by Malaysia, the
Philippines and Thailand. It was the first regional co-
operative effort of nations in Southeast Asia to be organized
without the participation of any major powers. It was,
however, handicapped by its limited membership and by
accusations that it was a pro- Western, anti- communist group
whose motive was to promote the interests of the United
14
States. The Association's activities were disrupted because of
the deterioration of relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila
over the latter' s claim over North Borneo (Sabah) , which later
became part of the Malaysian federation in 1963. ASA was later
revived when, Thailand, after so many attempts, succeeded in
hosting a conference in Bangkok in 1966, that was attended by
the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines. With the attendance of the disputing parties
(Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, and Indonesia and
Malaysia over Sarawak) , the meeting sealed the approval of
reconciliation and the idea for the creation of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formally presented.
The first major step in the regionalization of Southeast Asia
was finally created. ASA was later joined by Singapore and her
inclusion terminated the association and gave birth to the





The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a
regional organization formed by the governments of Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand through the
ASEAN Declaration or the "Bangkok Declaration" on August 8,
1967, in Bangkok, Thailand (Enclosure A. Map of Southeast
Asia). In 1984, Brunei joined the regional association. The
formation of the ASEAN was based on " the premise that co-
operation among nations in the spirit of equality and
partnership would bring mutual benefits and stimulate
solidarity which can contribute to building the foundations of
peace, stability, and prosperity in the world community at
large and in the ASEAN region in particular.
"
9
From the outset, the ASEAN was conceived as a regional
organization for economic, social and cultural co-operation
only. Its objective was to institutionalize cooperation in all
fields, except in the military arena. The founding fathers of
the organization, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, viewed
the ASEAN as a neutral grouping and not as a US -sponsored
security alliance patterned after the unsuccessful South-East
q
. 10 YEARS ASEAN, Secretariat, ASEAN, Sagittarius,
Press, Jakarta, Indonesia, p. 9.
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Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) . "Fear from being engulfed by
the great power rivalry and the uncertain credibility of great
power security guarantees in the late 1960s contributed to the
birth of an indigenous notion of regional order, best
reflected in the ASEAN' s 1971 proposal for ZOPFAN." 10 The Zone
of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) constituted a
commitment from the member states to abstain from policies
that would require external intervention in the region, most
especially from the superpowers.
With the end of the Vietnam War, and the US implementation
of the "Nixon Doctrine" urging its regional allies to assume
greater self-reliance in defense, the dream of the Association
for peace through neutrality was gradually being attained.
With the increased tensions of the Sino-Soviet rivalry,
however, and with the invasion and occupation of Cambodia by
Vietnam in 1978, the hope of the ASEAN countries to be free of
great -power rivalry in the southeast Asian region diminished.
The ASEAN had to accept the United States' and China's support
against perceived Soviet-backed Vietnamese expansionism.
Because of the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, the
old rivalry between East and West became a tri -polar conflict
in the form of an East -East -West entanglement in the region
(China -USSR -US) . Later, due to US-Soviet detente and Sino-US
10
. Acharya, Amitav, A New Regional Order in South- East
Asia: ASEAN in the Post -Cold War Era , ADELPHI Paper 279, The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1993,
p. 8.
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rapproachment in the 1980s, the Southeast Asian region,
particularly the Indochina subregion, became more of a Sino-
Soviet or an East -East rivalry.
Despite the presence of competing superpowers and the
crisis of Cambodia in the region, many political analysts
viewed the ASEAN as one of the most successful regional
organizations. As Frank Ching noted in 1993, "Now, 26 years
later, ASEAN is one of the most successful regional
organizations in the world.
"
n
The creation of the ASEAN marked the consummation of the
armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia and signalled
its founding members' intention to reduce the scope of further
inter- state warfare. Although intramural conflicts between
Malaysia and the Philippines over the Sabah issue and between
Singapore and its Malay neighbors (Indonesia and Malaysia)
threatened the existence of the ASEAN in the 1960s, the
regional group was able to survive, thanks to a sense of
common vulnerability in the face of the threat of externally
backed communist insurgencies. By the time the United States
withdrew from Vietnam in 1975, the ASEAN had succeeded in
diffusing intramural conflicts and was gradually developing
into a limited "security community, in the sense that no
member would seriously consider the use of force against
11
. Ching, Frank, "Eye on Asia", Far Eastern Economic
Review , August 12, 1993, p. 27.
18
another to settle disputes". 12 It was not, however, a defense
community, because there was no common threat and there were
divergences in cultural, ideological and historical
experiences. Consequently, the Association has had no common
defense or military alliance. Because of the impact of the
Indochinese conflict, however, a common threat was perceived
and the continuous cooperation developed through regular
political, diplomatic, cultural and military exchanges. This
development has caused greater cohesion among the ASEAN states
as the Singapore Foreign Minister claimed in 1982, "the ASEAN
nations had come to a point where intra-ASEAN conflict had
either become irrelevant or been muted considerably." 13
The Cold War regional order in Southeast Asia, however,
was in constant conflict with the ASEAN' s desire for regional
autonomy and with the reality that the influence and
involvement of the great -powers in the region will always be
present
.
B. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
The ASEAN organization formally states that cooperation
shall take into account the following objectives and
principles in the pursuit of political stability:
12
. Simon, Sheldon, Regional Security Structures in Asia:
The Question of Relevance , Paper prepared for the US War




" A Call for Unity" , AsiaweeK , October 22, 1982.
19
The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region
is an essential contribution to international peace and
security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats
posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening
national and ASEAN resilience.
Member states, individually and collectively, shall take
active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality.
The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy
is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore
intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with
particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on
the improvement of the living standard of their peoples.
Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard
the pace of development of member states. They shall extend,
within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member
states in distress. Member states shall take cooperative
action in their national and regional programs, utilizing as
far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to
broaden the complimentarity of their respective economies.
Member states, in the spirit of solidarity, shall rely
exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-
regional differences.
Member states shall strive, individually and collectively,
to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful
20
cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis
of mutual respect and mutual benefit.
Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of
regional identity and exert efforts to create a strong ASEAN
community. This shall be respected by all and respecting all
actions on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships in
accordance with the principles of self-determination,
sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal
affairs of nations. 14
C . ACCOMPL ISHMENTS
Since the Bangkok Declaration and the formation the
Association in August of 1967, no armed conflict has ever
erupted between the member nations of the ASEAN. This is
probably the single most important achievement of the
organization. Several intra- regional confrontations among
member states have occurred, involving border issues,
immigration, fishing rights, and problems of piracy. But
because of the cooperation and close mediation of the ASEAN
members, such conflicts have been resolved or discussed
diplomatically and peacefully at the negotiation table.
The regional stability created by the ASEAN in Southeast
Asia has greatly contributed to international peace and
14
. Declaration of ASEAN Accord, signed by all Head of
States of the Five Original Members of the ASEAN in Bali,
Indonesia, February 24, 1967.
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security. The continuous dialogue and exchange of information
among ASEAN members has created a strong solidarity and built
an image of confidence not only within Southeast Asia, but
from a global perspective. Individually, the voices of the
ASEAN nations cannot be heard in international fora. But as an
organization, with members speaking as one, it is a major
concern to powerful nations and organizations.
This was demonstrated by the ASEAN in the Cambodian
conflict when the United Nations was forced to act and
compelled Vietnam to withdraw its forces in Cambodia. This was
done through the concerted actions of the ASEAN membership
which saw the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a threat. The
UN supervised election in Cambodia in 1993 culminated the
ASEAN goal of self-determination for the nations of the
region.
The removal of the American bases in the Philippines was
also a step in the realization of the Association's objective
for the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region. Though this move by the
Philippines was viewed by some ASEAN leaders as untimely,
particularly in Singapore, it was welcomed by Indonesia and
Malaysia.
The importance of the ASEAN was also recognized by the
international community when the rich nations and
organizations like the United States, Japan, South Korea, and
other nations, as well as the European Community (EC), agreed
22
to become dialogue partners in the annual ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference ( AS EAN - PMC ) held after every ASEAN
Ministerial conference. This shows that the ASEAN consensus is
of great importance to these powerful dialogue partners. The
ASEAN- PMC was later joined by China, Vietnam and other
Southeast Asian nations as observers.
23
IV. ASEAN STATES' NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ASEAN
A. BRUNEI
The inclusion of Brunei in the ASEAN became the corner
stone of its external legitimacy in 1984. The absolute monarch
of Brunei or the Malay Muslim Monarch (Melayu Islam Bereja,
MIB) , had been challenged by some of its neighbors. Since its
independence in 1984, Brunei's constitution has characterized
Negara Brunei Darussalam as the Beraja Islam Melayu
(Monarchical Islamic Malay) state. The legitimacy of the rule
of the Sultan which bases its governance on the dictates of
Islam has been questioned due to the absence of any popular
participation by the people in the political process. Thus,
the profile of Brunei in international politics has been low.
After joining the ASEAN, however, Brunei's recognition as part
of the international system has been firmly established.
Today, Brunei is, in many ways, a modern welfare state.
The government, though relatively new, has provided basically
more than the basic needs of its people. Compared to other
developed nations, it has high levels- of education, health
standard and longevity. However, in spite of its enormous
wealth, its extreme dependence on the oil industry has caused
a one-sided economic structure which has created complex
internal problems for the country. As a consequence of the
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booming oil industry, all other sectors of the nation's
economy have been hampered. Rubber, which was once a major
crop of the country, was phased out by 1980. Farming has
become part time and agriculture has virtually disappeared. It
now contributes less than 1 per cent of the total GNP. This
made the country dependent of imports on all food and
construction materials.
The country's economy is mainly engaged in the high income
oil and construction industries. Construction, after oil, is
its second main commerce because of the government's high
investment in infrastructure. However, due to the high living
standard which resulted from the expanding oil and
construction business, wages have increased so much that there
is a large influx of immigrant workers to fill the big demand
for manual labor. This has changed the attitude of the
country's privileged Malay population into a desire to work
for the government, and to leave the private sector and manual
labor to the immigrants. About half of the working population
of Brunei is found in the public sector. 15
The importance, therefore, of Brunei's membership in the
ASEAN is paramount because of its dependence on exports. Other
ASEAN states provide Brunei food and help run the nation's
economy by supplying immigrant manual laborers. The small
nation of about 250,000 with a small armed force also needs
15
. Blomqvist, Hans, C. , "Brunei's Strategic Dilemmas",
Pacific Review , Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 172-173.
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the ASEAN to help guarantee its land and sea borders. Despite
Brunei's lack of military capabilities, the ASEAN' s solidarity
guarantees that the country's oil wealth will be preserved and
that no ambitious nation will dare interfere in the domestic
affairs of the country for fear of ASEAN pressure.
B. INDONESIA
"Ketahanan Nasional" or National Resilience has been the
foundation of the Indonesian doctrine and national strategy.
National resilience is a dynamic condition of will power,
determination and firmness with the ability to develop
national strength to face and overcome all manners of
threats internal and external, direct or indirect, that
may endanger the Indonesian national identity and the
total way of life of the nation and its people, and to
achieve the objectives of the national struggle ....
National resilience is an organizational and management
concept for peace, prosperity and order in the life of the
Indonesian nation based on Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution. 16
National resilience was initially conceived from the
country's experience in the Indonesian struggle for
independence against the Dutch. Despite the superiority of the
Dutch in terms of organization, resources and international
support, the Indonesians succeeded in their war for
independence through positive mental attitudes (never losing
hope) , the mobilization of all resources (men, women and
children) , and the employment of strategies that harnessed
16
. Explanatory Note to the Republic of Indonesia Law, No
20, paragraph 5, 1982.
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indigenous strengths and exploited the weakness of the
enemy. I7
For the Indonesians, it is vital for the nation to be
resilient and self-reliant. It means that a country should
never depend on an external force to defend its sovereignty.
The fall of South Vietnam and non- communist Cambodia and Laos
were viewed by the Indonesian military as a result of their
excessive reliance on external support. It is for these
reasons that Indonesia was a zealous opponent of the SEATO and
a proponent among the ASEAN states of the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) , and the nuclear- weapons- f ree
zone in the region. The ultimate purpose of the ZOPFAN, for
Indonesia, was to deny opportunities for intervention by
extraregional powers and to regulate the presence and
activities of external powers in the region.
In line with Indonesia's policy of self-reliance, it, more
than any other nation of the ASEAN, is committed to patrolling
and controlling its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) . These
are one of the busiest commercial routes in the world
connecting the Gulf through the Indian Ocean to Northeast
Asia.
The current plan of Indonesia to modernize its defense
force calls for the procurement of 30 maritime patrol aircraft
17
. Suwondo, Purdo, S., "Some Notes on the History of
Nation-Building and Insurgencies in Indonesia: An Indonesian
View", Asiaweek , September 20, 1983, pp. 42-43.
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equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles. In addition to the
budgeted 30 domestically built corvettes and 23 missile
frigates, Jakarta is negotiating with China and Germany for
more acquisitions. Indonesia's aging A-4E/h Skyhawks are
scheduled to be replaced by mid-decade with British Hawk 200
fighter-bombers and enough F-16s to reach a full compliment of
60. 18 When all these systems are commissioned, Indonesia will
have considerably enhanced its ability not only to defend its
sea space against piracy, smuggling, and other unwanted
activity but to defend a large part of the ASEAN region.
Among the member states of the ASEAN, Indonesia is the
only country that has the potential for development as a major
military power in the region. It has the population and the
potential wealth based on its oil deposits. Its strategic
location at the middle of the critical Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia, linking the Indian
Ocean and the Andaman Sea to the Pacific Ocean and the South
China Sea, gives it a good reason to strengthen its navy. With
the diminishing US presence i-n the region, a strong Indonesia
would give the ASEAN a sense of security from any ambitious
intentions of either China or India.
If the ASEAN states will set aside rivalries and
suspicions among themselves, support Indonesia in its military
modernization and assist in safeguarding the SLOCs in the
Asian Defense Journal , March 1992, p. 15
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region, this will greatly enhance the security and stability
of Southeast Asia and strengthen the Association.
C. MALAYSIA
Security in not just a matter of military capabilities.
National security is inseparable from political stability,
economic success through international trade and
harmonious diplomatic relations. Without these, all the
guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being
overcome by its enemies, whose ambition can be fulfilled
sometimes without firing a single shot. All they need to
do is to subvert the people and set up a puppet regime. 19
This statement of Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dato
Mahathir, in 1986, emphasized the country's trust in diplomacy
and dependence on international trade. It was a time when the
economy of the country was prospering and emerging into one of
the so-called Asian Dragons. To maintain the thrust of the
nation's progress in economic development, Malaysia should
improve its relationship with its neighboring countries,
particularly in trade and set aside old border and territorial
disputes.
Until the mid-1970s, Malaysia was faced with numerous
threats to its national security. Internally, the two major
security concerns have been the threat of communist insurgency
and the threat of racial and religious extremism. For the past
four decades, the banned Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) and
19
. Dato Seri Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of
Malaysia, Speech before the First ISIS National Conference on
National Security, at ISIS, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 15,
1986.
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its factions have been waging an unsuccessful guerrilla war to
overthrow the legally constituted government. The emergency
measures adopted in the 1948-60 period reduced the threat to
a relatively minor one. Although there was a resurgence of the
threat in the early 19 70s, it is now under control. Compounded
by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the developments in
Eastern Europe and improved relations with China, the appeal
of communism, particularly to relatively affluent Malaysians,
has diminished. The CPM may, however, attempt to advance its
cause by exploiting domestic (racial and religious) strife.
The delicate racial and religious composition of
Malaysia's population of 14 million (Malay-48 .2%, Chinese-
32.1%, Indian-8.5%, Other indigenous- 11 . 1%)
,
20 has also made
the development of domestic political consensus a formidable
task. Several race riots between the majority Malay and the
Chinese minority occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
With the joint efforts of the government and the civilian
sectors, especially after the formation of Singapore in 1965,
racial discrimination has been minimized.
Among the ASEAN states, Malaysia could be considered as
one of the more progressive nations and is approaching Newly
Industrialized Country (NIC) status. However, due to the
increasing wealth of the average Malaysian, like Brunei, the
20
. Source: General Report of the Population Census
Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 1985 (Kuala Lumpur
Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1987)
.
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country now depends on inexpensive immigrant workers from its
Asian neighbors for its manual labor, as in Brunei. This has
generated an influx of illegal migrants workers from other
countries, particularly the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan,
and Bangladesh. To prevent this and to arrest this illegal
immigrants, the government adopted strict measures which were
considered violations of human rights by other countries.
These included making arrests after religious services in
Catholic churches and mosques. This policy has caused
considerable resentment among some members of the ASEAN.
The border issues, in which Malaysia has disputes with all
the ASEAN states, and the migration problem, are present
concerns which the Association could help settle. In fact, the
territorial dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over
Sabah, and the problem over the Sarawak with Indonesia in the
1960s would have erupted into an armed confrontation without
the intervention of the ASEAN.
In its economic, Malaysia in 1990 , through its Prime
Minister Dato Mahathir, wanted the ASEAN and other East Asian
states to form an independent economic block, the East Asia
Economic Group (now Caucus - EAEC) , without the United States.
This was, however, rejected by Japan. Malaysia's economic
intentions were also viewed by the ASEAN states as
unacceptable since only 15% of ASEAN exports in 1988 were
traded within Southeast Asia; almost 80% were with the United
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States. 21 Malaysia's design for a greater ASEAN economic
grouping is not feasible at this time since most of the ASEAN
countries' economies depend on the United States.
External threat perceptions to the country have been the
Peoples Republic of China, Vietnam and the former Soviet
Union, in that order.
D. THE PHILIPPINES
The Philippines is the only ASEAN member state which faces
a complex combination of internal and external problems.
Internally, the country is confronted by communist insurgents,
Muslim secessionists, military rightist rebels, and
uncontrolled criminality, compounded by double digit inflation
and a declining economy. Intramural conflict involves the
lingering dispute with Malaysia over Sabah and the contested
claims in the South China Sea over the Spratly Islands.
In the 1950s, the country was a model among the Third
World nations in the region as far as containing communist
subversives and developing its economy. The Philippines was
way ahead of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and other East
Asian nations in its economic and political development in the
1950s and early 1960s. However, because of the country's
desire and American influence to pursue an open and free
economy with democratic ways, patterned after the developed
21
. Gibney, Frank, B.
,
"Creating a Pacific Community"'
Foreign Affairs , November/December 1992, p. 21.
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Western countries, (which the Filipinos were not ready to
accept) , the country plunged into an economic and political
tail spin. For almost twenty years, former president Ferdinand
Marcos maintained martial law and, under his authoritarian
rule, made the nation into one of the poorest states in the
region burdened with graft and corruption, political cronysm,
and governmental mismanagement.
Marcos was ousted in 19 86, by a popular "Peoples
Revolution" which installed a new president, Corazon Aquino,
the widow of a slain popular political leader. Aquino brought
back the democratic system of government, but because she was
inexperienced and displayed poor leadership, the Philippines
turned from bad to worse.
In 1992, a new president was elected, Fidel V. Ramos, from
whom much was expected. A graduate of the US Military Academy
(West Point) , Ramos promised to make the nation be at par with
its ASEAN neighbors by the end of his term in 1998. The
country is making progress, but at a very slow rate. The
present administration has to solve the numerous internal
problems it faces. The rightist military rebels have been
neutralized, and the government claims that the communist
insurgency has been minimized, but the Muslim secessionist
campaign and the lack of local peace and order are still major
threats to the country's national security.
The military and the local police which are the primary
agencies tasked in maintaining peace and order are in a very
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sad state. Because of the pull-out of the US bases in the
Philippines, upon which these agencies relied heavily for
modern equipment and training, the country will have
difficulty in attaining its goal in joining the NICs ( Newly
Industrialized Countries) in the region.
The ASEAN solidarity has helped the Philippines, when all
the ASEAN Head of States agreed to meet in Manila for the
ASEAN Summit Meeting in 1987, in spite of the worsening peace
and order situation prevailing in the country. The Philippines
needed an opportunity to show the international community that
the country was safe for foreign investments . The presence of
all the ASEAN Heads of State showed that the Philippines was
not as dangerous as pictured in the press. It also helped
bolster the declining image of the house wife turned
president, Corazon Aquino.
Economically, the Philippines was able to use the ASEAN to
raise the price of coconut oil and sugar in the international
market. The sugar quota of the Philippines to the United
States was greatly reduced in the early 1980s. This reduction
has immensely damaged the economy of the country, together
with the decrease of the price of coconut oil. The ASEAN, as
a group, could put pressure in the international market for
the stabilization of the prices of these commodities to
include rubber, tin and other products produced by different
ASEAN states.
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Until the Philippines has solved its internal problems, it
cannot do much to meet its international obligations and
cooperate actively in collective regional security matters.
E. SINGAPORE
Singapore is an island city-state with an area of about
240 square miles. The strategic vulnerabilities of the country
- its size, location, very short history as a nation and state,
demography, and total dependence on the international market
economy - have a decisive influence on its foreign policy,
national interests and the development of its defense
doctrine. The country's security is best described by the
statement of Goh Chok Tong:
The (Singapore Armed Forces) alone cannot guarantee the
safety of your home and family. . . . modern wars involve not
only the armed forces but also everyone in the community.
Long before the first shot is fired, would-be aggressors
will try to create political instability and divide the
people. Witness Iran and Cambodia. A united community that
feels and thinks as one has no crack for others to
exploit. 22
The problem of the small size of the country is compounded
by its geostrategic location. It has two relatively giant
neighbors, Malaysia in the north and Indonesia to the west and
south. This prevents Singapore from creating strategic depth
at sea and in the air which is vital to the country's national
22
. Goh Chok Tong, Former First Prime Minister Singapore,
"Working with One Accord Towards Total Defense", Singapore
Armed Forces Newsletter . February 19 84, p. 5.
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defense. The political and economic conditions of these
neighbors greatly affect the nation's general position.
The demographic profile of the country's population also
adds to its security concerns. There is little or no common
bond uniting the different ethnic groups that make up
Singapore's 2.7 million population (Chinese 76.6 percent,
Malays 14.7 percent, Indians 6.4 percent, and others 2.4
percent) . As in Malaysia, this racial and religious mix has
the potential for domestic strife which is compounded by the
racial and religious conditions of its two neighbors,
especially Malaysia. There is a possibility of racial and
religious conflict in Malaysia spilling over into Singapore or
internal conflict within the country providing the opportunity
for intervention by neighboring countries. Singapore's
predominantly Chinese population sets Singapore apart from its
Malay-Muslim neighbors.
Among the ASEAN countries, only Singapore has attained the
status of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) . For the
country to maintain its economic advantage, it must rely
heavily on the security and stability of the region. This is
the reason why Singapore readily offered to host United States
military facilities when the US bases in the Philippines were
pulled out. Singapore policy planners believe that the
presence of the United States is still vital for the region's
security in spite the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
partial settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Some critics
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denounced Singapore because of this initiative. They said it
was a breach of ASEAN solidarity for making such a unilateral
decision which will clearly affect all the member countries of
ASEAN. The presence of US forces in the country was also seen
as a violation of the ASEAN policy of ZOPFAN and the 1976
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
Malaysia was the most vocal critic of the offer by
Singapore, and said that the presence of the United States in
Singapore was designed to enhance Singapore's military status,
to alter the regional balance of power, and to make the
country a "superpower base." Malaysia's Information Minister
and UMNO Secretary- General Datuk Mohamed Rahman said
Singapore's action was aggressively directed at Malaysia:
You are telling us: What you see is this sea of hostile
Malays surrounding you and you are saying: 'Hey, don't
meddle with us, we have the Americans behind us.' 23
Malaysia firmly believes that it has consultative rights
over Singapore's foreign policy which derive from history and
proximity. By contrast, Thailand's reaction to Singapore's
offer was positive. Bangkok says that the United States
continuous presence would promote regional security and
substantially reduce the ASEAN defense expenditures. For
Indonesia, President Soharto presented no objection as long as
the facilities will be confined to maintenance functions only,
23
. "Singapore Urged to Think Again on Bases Offer to US",
Straits Times (Singapore) , Weekly Overseas Edition , September
9, 1989, p. 2.
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"if it goes beyond maintenance, this will be dangerous as it
will attract outside powers to the region. ',24
Other major vulnerabilities of Singapore are its total
dependence on the international economy and a heavy reliance
on imported labor. The country's impressive economic growth
has been a function of its ability to trade with, and service,
international clients. Sharp downturns in the international
economy would have negative consequences, not only for
Singapore's national economy but also for the political
stability and security of the island republic. The negative
growth rate registered in 1985 demonstrated the country's
economic vulnerability.
Regarding the manpower requirements of the country,
150,000 immigrant workers make-up about one-quarter of the
nation's manufacturing sector work- force. 25 Though foreign
workers have contributed greatly to economic progress of
Singapore, like Malaysia, the influx of migrant workers into
the country has caused a lot of concern to the government. To
remedy the situation, in 1988, a S$60 million incentive
package was introduced to the employers to automate production
and mandated a policy of lowering the maximum dependency ratio
on foreign workers from 50 to 40 percent. In 1989, legislation
24
. As quoted in "Jakarta Won't Object if Offer is
Restricted to Maintenance Only", Straits Times (Singapore)
.
Weekly Overseas Edition , October 7, 1989, p. 12.
25
. "High Price of Foreign Labor", Singapore Bulletin
.
Editorial, December 1988, p. 2.
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was passed amending the Immigration Act of Singapore that a
mandatory three months' imprisonment and three strokes of
rattan (caning) was to apply to any foreigner entering the
country illegally or overstaying in excess of 90 days. This
was condemned by other ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand,
which has the largest number of illegal migrants. The concern
of the Thais caused Singapore to offer amnesty to these
illegal workers and they were repatriated to their own
countries
.
Singapore does not depend much on its ASEAN neighbors for
trade, but relies the United States and Europe for investments
and exports. These constitute more than 45% of the total (US-
30.95; EEC-15%) . Only Malaysia within the ASEAN has
substantial imports from Singapore (8.4%), while Japan has
9.4%. 26
Singapore as a small island state, to avoid being
overshadowed by bigger nations and to successfully maintain
its lead economically in the international setting, must
invest heavily in international and regional organizations.
F . THAILAND
With the partial settlement of the Cambodian problem,
Thailand has turned its attention from Indochina as a
26
. Beng, Cheah, H. , "Towards A Sustained Recovery in the
Singapore Economy and the New Capitalism", Southeast Asian
Affair 1990 , Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, p. 331.
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battlefield to Indochina as a market place. Thailand, like
Malaysia, is developing into a NIC.
With the assumption of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan
in 1988, Thailand's first elected Prime Minister since the
short-lived and violence -plagued government of Kukrit and Seni
Pramoj
,
(March 1975 to October 1976) and the conservative
administration of General Prem Tinsulanonda, the country has
progressed considerably. The stewardship of Chatichai, a
former Army Major -General and head of the Chart Thai (Thai
Nation) Party, was initially viewed with uncertainty and was
not expected to last long. The unstable Chart Thai -led
coalition of six parties only survived the four year
constitutional term, but strengthened its democratic process.
The success of the government is partly based on
Chatichai' s own widespread popularity. A long-time veteran of
Thai political battles, beginning as a young officer at the
time of his father Lieutenant -General Phin Choonhavan' s 1947
coup, Chatichai came to the Prime Minister's Office with the
reputation of being a good- time -loving playboy. In office,
however, the 69-year-old Chatichai, worked 12-14 hour days,
and has demonstrated deft political skills and a public style
that has appealed to the people. As a populist politician,
Prime Minister Chatichai has shown a seldom- erring ability to
keep his finger on the public pulse. He has rewarded his
business supporters, kept the bureaucrats off-balance, and
forged an independent foreign policy course that rhetorically
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infuses Thai nationalism with new vitality as Thailand acts to
turn the battlefields of Indochina into a market-place. 27
Thailand's major shift in its foreign policy was in 1989,
when Chatichai gave Hun Sen of the People's Republic of
Kampuchea (PRK) a warm reception in Bangkok. This move was
inconsistent with the other ASEAN states' stand, which
insisted that to talk with the Phnom Pehn regime was to confer
legitimate status on the Vietnamese backed government of
Cambodia. However, this action of Thailand though initially
unpopular, proved to be a wise strategic move which paved the
way for the eventual settlement of the Cambodian crisis. The
Hun Sen visit made the three Khmer Resistance factions
recognize the reality of the PRK government. Prince Sihanouk
dropped his initial demand for a complete dismantling of the
Hun Sen government prior to negotiations and a UN- supervised
general election.
Thai diplomacy may have been limited in the settlement of
the Cambodian crisis due to the interest and active
participation of the great powers in the Paris Conference, but
Thailand's move toward friendly relations with Phnom Penh and
its cordial affiliation with Vietnam, has assured Bangkok of
great participation in transforming Indochina from a War Zone
to Trade Zone.
27
. Weatherbee, Donald, E., "Thailand in 19 89", Southeast
Asian Affairs 1990 , Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1990,
pp. 335-337.
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As far as regional organizations are concerned, the
Chatichai government has downgraded its ASEAN participation.
With its impending NIC status, the country seems to view the
ASEAN nations as competitors rather than partners in building
a regional economy. Bangkok shares the view of Australia and
Japan that any economic grouping in East Asia should include
the United States and wider participation of other NICs
.
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V. INTERESTS OF THE GREAT POWERS
A. UNITED STATES
During the Cold War, the United States' primary goal in
Asia was " to create a series of primarily bilateral security
agreements that would serve as a cordon sanitaire around the
Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China as well as
their allies in North Korea and Indochina." 28 Containment , the
purpose of which was to establish allies in all regions of the
world to stop the spread of communism, NATO in Europe, SEATO
in Southeast Asia, South Korea and Japan in Northeast Asia are
but a few of the bilateral and multilateral alliances of the
United States in the containment of communism. The US military
presence in Japan, Korea and the Philippines was forward-
deployed forces in the Pacific designed to serve as quick
response forces for any crisis. It was deterrence against the
expansionist ambitions of communist countries. US commitments
to the different bilateral defense treaties with other Asian
nations were part of that deterrence. It was there to protect
the sea lanes of South China Sea, the Western Pacific to the
Andaman Sea, and the Indian Ocean. (Enclosure B)
The United States interests in the region have been varied
and based mostly on a bilateral relations. The United States'
28
. Simon, S. Op. Cit. p. 1
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treaties and alliances with individual states differ depending
on the threats facing the country and on the interests of the
United States. From World War II until the Nixon
administration and the so-called "Nixon Doctrine", American
involvement in the Southeast Asian region was demonstrated by
a commitment of US troops to contain the spread of communism
and by aid for economic recovery. After the collapse of South
Vietnam, and during the Nixon administration, because of the
anti-war sentiments in the United States, US troop involvement
was gradually withdrawn. However, military and economic aid
continued to assist the countries of the region in their
internal communist insurgency problems and for their continued
economic recovery.
During the latter part of the Reagan period, when the
economies of the ASEAN countries were developing and evolving
into trade competitors and there was a manifestation of ASEAN
solidarity and strength, US attention gradually shifted from
individual states to the regional organization and from the
viewpoint of security to US economic perspectives. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the diminishing threat of
communism, the emergence of the "Economic Dragons", the
withdrawal of US bases from the Philippines, and the domestic
demand for cuts in US defense spending, all sizeable US forces
in the ASEAN region have been withdrawn. The Clinton
administration is now focusing its attention heavily on
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economic relations. However, even with the end of the Cold War
the United States' security interests in Asia remain: 29
1. protecting the United States and its allies from
attack
2. maintaining regional peace and stability
3
.
preserving US political and economic access
4. contributing to nuclear deterrence
5 . fostering the growth of democracy and human rights
6. stopping proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, and ballistic missile system
7. ensuring freedom of navigation
8. reducing illicit drug trafficking
Also, the "Six Principle of US Security Policy in Asia"
are: 30
1. Assurance of American engagement in Asia and the
Pacific.
2. A strong system of bilateral security arrangements.
3. Maintenance of modest but capable forward -deployed
US forces.




. A Strategic Framework for the Asia- Pacific Rim, Report
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Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East
Asia and Pacific Region)
.
30
. Secretary Richard Cheney, US Secretary of Defense,
"Six Basic Principles of US Security in Asia", Speech an the
APEC in Tokyo, Japan, November 22, 1991.
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5. US Asian allies should assume greater
responsibility for their own defense.
6. Complementary defense cooperation.
US interests in the region, are consistent with the views
of some ASEAN leaders that the US presence in the Asia- Pacific
region is necessary for regional security and that US
disengagement in Asia will pose a threat to the stability of
ASEAN. 31 This may not be compatible with the ASEAN principle
of ZOPFAN, but the United States is the only power with the
political, economic and military weight to ensure that the
long-term challenges to peace and security within the region,
from China and Japan, remain benign and constrained.
The stability of the region is of utmost interest to the
United States because this will assure the continuity of the
US -East Asia and Pacific two-way trade which has increased
steadily since 1967. (Enclosure C) . This trade is greater than
U.S. its trade with Western Europe and Latin America. The
security of the area will also mean stable and increasing
trade with the growing economy of China.
The United States' policy with the ASEAN can best be
described by the statement of the US Secretary of State James
Baker before the ASEAN Post Ministerial conference in July 6,
1989.
31
. Kreisberg, Paul, H. , Chui, Daniel, Y. , and Kahan,
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Our respect for and collective effort with ASEAN serve as
a pillar of U.S. policy in the Pacific Together, we
must ensure the security and stability of the Pacific.
U.S. security commitments in the region have fostered an
environment in which the ASEAN economies have flourished.
Changing threats and resource constraints notwithstanding,
the United States intends to maintains its presence in
East Asia. 32
The continued presence of the U.S. in the region will also
discourage any hegemonic ambition of any state for regional
power. It serves as a balancing factor to China, Japan and
other external actors with a zeal for power in Southeast Asia.
B. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Since World War II, from a Western perspective, post-war
China has always been viewed as a politically unstable,
overpopulated and industrially infant nation. However from the
Southeast Asian viewpoint, it is a formidable neighbor. To
some the PRC was seen as a guarantor and a source of support
against hostile Soviet -Vietnamese alliance. To others, China
is a future adversary which is building-up its strength to
assert regional hegemony when the time is ripe.
At present, China is preoccupied with internal economic
reform efforts, which were hampered by the 19 89 Tiananmen
incident and compounded by spiralling hyperinflation and
growing corruption. The future of its' foreign policies will
32
. Secretary Baker, US State Department, Address at the
ASEAN- PMC in Brunei, July 6, 19 89.
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depend generally on the future of China's aging supreme
leader, Deng Xiaoping and other octogenarian policy makers.
During the Cold War, China's foreign policy has been
largely built on the triangular framework of United States,
the Soviet Union and China. With the collapse of the USSR and
the developments in Eastern Europe, China has gained a
considerable benefit. The normalization of relations with
Russia and the removal of the military threat from the former
Soviet Union, China has been able to negotiate significant
reductions in the forces deployed along the former Sino- Soviet
border. This is probably the only time that the country has
felt secure in that area.
Traditionally, Communist China has been a supporter of
local communist movements in the ASEAN region, from Thailand
to Indonesia and the Philippines. This partisan moral and
material support to local insurgents has elevated local
conflicts to an international level. However, due to
aggressive diplomatic efforts, and the eventual normalization
of diplomatic relations with China by all the ASEAN states,
support for these local insurgents has ceased. By the early
1990s, China and all the ASEAN states have established or
resumed diplomatic relations with one another. The Sino-ASEAN
relations are now better than before since the local
Communists and, to a large extent, the ethnic Chinese have
become less of a problem to the ASEAN.
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Despite China's internal problems, the country's economy
is growing at an astronomical pace with huge increases in
defense spending. "China is the fastest growing economy in the
world, with what may be the fastest growing military
budget." 33 What worries the ASEAN countries most is the
military build-up that China has embarked upon. "In 1992, it
purchased 26 SU-27 fighter jets from Russia, and it is
expected to buy another dozen or more. China has also
reportedly bought SA-lOs, a missile similar to the American
Patriot, but perhaps not as sophisticated, from Moscow. By
some accounts it is also negotiating for the purchase of up to
79 MIG-31 fighters, which could be built in China's Guizhou
Province in cooperative arrangement with Moscow. China has
acquired air fueling technology, apparently from Pakistan and
Iran, and it is believed to have converted some bombers into
tanker aircraft." 34 Some military analysts believe that the
Chinese are contemplating the acquisition of an aircraft
carrier. 35
Another major concern of the ASEAN is China's claims over
the Spratly Islands. In early 1992, China decided to legislate
sovereignty over the Spratly, Paracel , and Diaoyutai Island
33
. Kristof, Nicholas, D., New York Times former Bureau
Chief (1988-1993), "The Rise of China", Foreign Affairs ,
November/December 1993, Vol. 72, No. 5, p. 59
34
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35
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groups. This decision has renewed long -simmering disputes with
neighboring countries. Japan and several ASEAN countries,
surprised by the new Chinese law, have lodged protests to test
Beijing's response. Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnamese
officials have made commitments that the Spratly problems will
definitely be resolved through peaceful negotiations.
Analysts maintain that China does not have the
military muscle to forcibly occupy all the
islands it claims and its official statements
have called for negotiations. Therefore, the
latest law could be a ploy by Peking to draw
out the legal and negotiating strategies of
other countries before China itself decides on
its own course of action. 36
Also, the ASEAN is concerned with the continuous supply of
military equipment to Burma. It has also made an apparent deal
with Burma in developing two islands in the Indian Ocean as an
observation post- and perhaps eventually as some kind of a
naval base
.
China's intention at the present may just be to enhance
its economic position and to strengthen its defense for
external threats. As viewed by other nations, however,
particularly the ASEAN nations, the build-up of ones own
defense can be interpreted as an aggressive act by another.
Economically, China also represents a source of economic
competition for the ASEAN states. It is a direct rival in
certain markets, such as Japan, and for certain products,
36
. "China, Testing the Waters", Far Eastern Economic
Review , March 12, 1992, pp. 8-9.
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especially raw materials and agriculture. Equally important
for much of Southeast Asia is China's capacity to attract
foreign investment, particularly from Japan, Hong Kong and
Taiwan, thereby reducing foreign direct investment in the
region.
Another problem in the Sino-ASEAN relations which might be
encountered at present is the perennial Taiwan issue. Because
of Taiwan's progressive economy, the ASEAN states have to
maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan which Beijing has
continuously protested. Taiwan has pursued strong relations
with the ASEAN and like China, has expressed its desire to be
a dialogue partner of ASEAN.
Despite all these apprehensions, the Sino-ASEAN relations
have greatly improved. As both sides are expected to enjoy
growth, there is an added incentive to further economic
cooperation to sustain their growth and combat protectionism
in the industrialized world. China has even suggested at the
July 1992 ASEAN- PMC Conference in Manila that Beijing and
ASEAN should sign an agreement modeled on the treaty between
China and the European Community (EC) to further economic and
trade cooperation. A market -oriented and prosperous China
offers clear economic opportunities to the developing
economies of Southeast Asia. The mutual political and economic
needs of the PRC and the ASEAN states, especially after the
resolution of the Cambodian conflict, will mean a stable and
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secure Southeast Asian region. As Malaysian Foreign Minister
Datuk Abdullah Badawi was quoted in a June 1993 speech,
As a potential economic and political superpower (China)
has to be reckoned with. It could be in the interest of
the Southeast Asian countries to ensure that China becomes
constructively engaged in regional affairs. 37
C. JAPAN
As Charles Morrison observed,
For the past quarter of a century, there has been
speculation about Japan's future international and
regional roles, fueled principally by three phenomena:
Japan's rise to economic superpower status, the huge gap
between its economic and technological capabilities and
its limited political and military strength, and the
inability of the Japanese to articulate a clear-cut and
convincing statement of their future international
interest
.
Japan's Southeast Asian policy has undergone
transformation since World War II. From the early 1950s to
mid- '60s, the relationship was characterized by the pursuit of
economic diplomacy through payments of reparation for war
damages. It was a period when there were still antagonism and
hostile feelings by the Asian countries toward Japan because
of its war atrocities. Following the reparation period towards
the end of 1960s, Japan's policy shifted to a more active
participation in regional economic development -e.g. , the
37
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establishment of the Asian Development Bank, the Ministerial
Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and
the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC) . The major involvement of
Japan in Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN, was a result
of the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine". The then Prime Minister
Takeo Fukuda declared in August of 1977 Japan's positive
politico- economic role in Southeast Asia. The three principles
of the Fukuda Doctrine were: Japan rejects a military role;
Japan will do its best to consolidate relationships of mutual
confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding;
and Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN while aiming at
fostering mutual understanding with the nations of
Indochina. 39 This Doctrine was aimed at giving Japan a greater
political role in Southeast Asia by securing a stable
coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina.
Japan's relationship with the ASEAN has always been tied
to economic assistance. This is to remedy the anti- Japanese
sentiments with some ASEAN states due to the great trade
imbalance existing between Japan and ASEAN. Japanese
protectionism and high tariffs, make it difficult for ASEAN
products to enter Japan. This was exacerbated by the Japanese
use of synthetic rubber which severely affected Malaysia and
other rubber producing nations in the region. Some ASEAN
39
. Sudo, Suedo, "JAPAN-ASEAN RELATIONS, New Dimensions
in Japanese Foreign Policy", Asian Survey , Vol. XXVIII, No. 5,
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critics claimed that Japan only gives in to economic pressures
from the West, mainly the United States.
In spite of the trade friction between them, ASEAN
countries have begun to undertake emulation policies,
following the success of Japan's economic development.
Malaysia has adopted a "Look East" policy, and Singapore a
"Learn from Japan Movement."
In regional security issues, the current economic problems
of the United States, the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union, and the end of the Cold War, have created a situation
wherein the United States has had to change its dominant role
in East Asia. Because of the closure of the US bases in the
Philippines (Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base) , and the US
Congress' demand for cuts in defense spending and the Pacific
force down-sizing as presented in the 1990 East Asia Strategic
Initiative Report (EASI) (Enclosure D)
,
future regional
political -military relationships will be determined greatly by
an indigenous power like Japan despite its "Fukuda Doctrine"
of a small Military role. It is, of course, in the economic
dimensions that Japan greatly leads in the world and the Asia-
Pacific region in particular. But Japan is moving toward more
political involvement in the Southeast Asian region. Although
actively engaged in all aspects of economic life in the
region, Japan has not, however, assumed the role of regional
spokesman or has it sought to establish a clear position of
regional economic and political leadership. It is probably
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feared that any regional initiatives might be misinterpreted
both at home and abroad as an attempt to restore the prewar
and wartime notion of a Japanese -led co-prosperity sphere. US
leaders, however, expect Japan to assume a greater role in
East Asia, particularly in defense of the sea lanes.
Since World War II, Japan has played a passive role in
international political affairs. " Under the policy direction
established by the former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in
the 1950' s, priority was given to reconstruction and
development , and Japan looked to the United States for
foreign policy leadership and security.
"
40 However, Japan has
lately shifted its passive international political role
towards a more active and aggressive regional role. "Although,
Japan's defense spending is about 1 percent of gross national
product (GNP) , it ranks third largest in the world and in
direct budget expenditure, larger than all the rest of East
and Southeast Asian states combined." 41 This, however,
reflects the far higher wage, procurement, and overhead costs
in Japan. Also, Japan's military forces are geared toward
defensive missions and have few projection capabilities. It
still depends on the United States for its external security.
Due to the events in the American environment, the United
States has played a major part, either directly and
40
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41
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indirectly, in increasing the pressure on Japan to play a more
active diplomatic and military role in the region and in the
world in general . The direct pressure from the United States
is focus on the increased "burden sharing" that Japan should
contribute to maintain the US forces in Japan. In 1991, Japan
contributed over $3.3 billion to support US forces in the
Pacific, which was about 50 percent of the cost of maintaining
US forces in Japan (less salaries, maintenance for US family
housing, and limited construction cost) . By 1995 the Japanese
are expected to pay about 73 percent of the cost of stationing
US forces in Japan. (Enclosure E) Other external pressures
came more indirectly in that the Japanese and others in Asia,
have felt less able to depend upon the United States to
protect their interests in a stable regional order, with the
elimination of the Soviet threat and the Chinese emphasis on
internal and economic affairs.
Two events have marked Japan's sudden change in its policy
of non- involvement in international security and military
affair. These important events were: 42
1. In April 1991, the Japanese government send
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to help clean-up Iraqi mines.
This marked the first time since World War II that a Japanese
military contingent had been sent overseas. The Japanese,
after consulting with the ASEAN countries, were given
42
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,
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general statements of support. China, however, warned about
long- term implications.
2. The Kaifu government reintroduced legislation to
permit Self-Defense Forces to participate in U.N. peace-
keeping missions. In June 1992, the PKO (Peace -keeping
Operations) Cooperation Law was finally passed in a compromise
form. Under the new legislation, Japan sent 700 Self -Defense
Forces engineering personnel to participate in the U.N. Peace-
keeping operation in Cambodia. This action represented a
historic departure in that for the first time since World War
II, Japanese military personnel were engaged in a foreign
operation in Asia. The legislation, however, does not permit
these personnel to be engaged in combat operations. It has
been reported that this unit had been attacked and was engaged
armed conflict.
These moves by the Japanese, though generally agreed to by
the ASEAN nations, have been viewed by many observers as the
start of a greater Japanese regional security involvement. 43
The acceptance by the ASEAN of the military involvement of
Japan in the Cambodian Resolution can be viewed as a sign of
acceptance of a Japanese security role beyond self-defense.
There are, however, two factors that are formidable obstacles
to any Japan -dominated sphere of influence in Asia. China
43
. Presented by participants of a 13 Asia- Pacific
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presents a major challenge for Japan's dominance due to
suspicions and deeply rooted experiences. China believes that
a strong Japan is a threat not only to China, but to the
region and it will do everything to prevent Japan from
attaining such a status. The other factor is Korea. Both North
and South Korea are extremely sensitive to signs of militarism
in Japan. Koreans on both sides of the DMZ believe that Japan
wants the division of the peninsula to remain, because of fear
of the power of a united Korea and to better exploit the
Koreans
.
Economic tensions are another source of friction in
Northeast Asia. Taiwan and South Korea regularly protest
Japan's huge bilateral trade surpluses with them. In contrast,
the ASEAN nations generally display a more positive attitude
toward a more comprehensive role by Japan in the Asia- Pacific
region. The Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abu Hassan Omar, in
May 19 89 noted that Japan would be the most single important
factor affecting ASEAN' s future. However, the most effective
means of developing, channeling and containing Japan's Asia-
Pacific role is through a strong regional institution. The
ASEAN with its solidarity can be a potent organization to
harness whatever hegemonic ambition Japan has.
D. RUSSIA/FORMER SOVIET UNION
Historically, the Soviet Union together with China has
been the traditional supporters of the local communist
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insurgents in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia. The
non- communist countries in the region have always been fearful
of the Soviet Union and communist expansionism. With the end
of the Cold War and the Soviet threat to Asia no longer
existing, Russia as the largest component of the former Soviet
Union, continues to play a security role in the region, though
on a very reduced basis. Some analysts characterize Russia as
a "tired superpower" trying to recuperate, acting as if it was
on a "self imposed exile" from the Asian region. 44 A large
part of Russia is in Asia, but its internal problems have made
it incapable of pursuing any real policy objective in the
region. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
December of 1991, strategic Soviet interests and military
power in the Southeast Asian region were diminishing.
The great concern over Russia and the former Soviet
republics are the high- technology weapons and know-how of all
kinds that may be marketed to other countries in exchange for
trade and to secure financial flows to assist their nationally
dwindling economy. It is not any threat that the Russians
might pose to the region which concerns ASEAN, but what it
cannot do to control the former satellites it had developed.
North Korea seems determined to develop its nuclear capability
due to the inability of Moscow to provide security from
potential external threat. Russian withdrawal of support to
44
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both Vietnam and North Korea has created an atmosphere of
insecurity for both of these countries. This poses threats to
the region as a whole.
At present, Russia's interest in the region is purely
focused on trade and possible markets for its sophisticated
weaponry. It will content itself to play a minor role in the
security system of the region and center its policy on its
relation with the United States.
E. INDIA
India's ambition to assume the role of a great power has
caused concern to Southeast Asian countries. Indian policy
makers believe that all approaches to the Indian Ocean should
be controlled by the Indian Navy. This includes the Malacca
Straits and the Andaman Islands. The expansion of the Indian
Navy, which includes 2 aircraft carriers, 5 Soviet Kashin
class destroyers, and 21 frigates, 45 has increased other
Southeast Asian nations' apprehension over India's intentions,
particularly those bordering the Indian Ocean. In addition,
India has developed an airlift capability which was
demonstrated when two battalions were airlifted to the Madives
in response to the coup of November 1988. India has also
tested an ICBM (2,400) called Agni in May 1989, as well as a
surface-to-surface short-range missile called Prithvi in
45
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February 1989. The Bangkok Post claimed that India had come of
age as a military power and wanted ' international recognition
as a world player.' 46 India's military build-up is a
contradiction of its proposal for making the Indian Ocean a
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, similar to the ZOPFAN
concept of the ASEAN. The Indian Navy has extended its
presence and influence over vast areas of the Indian Ocean
beyond its exclusive economic zone. It has also thwarted a UN
resolution making South Asia a nuclear-free zone by developing
its nuclear capability, thereby encouraging Pakistan in
nuclear arm race. 47
During the Cold War, the superpowers seemed to accept the
changing role of India as a powerful regional actor as a
counterweight to China. From the Southeast Asian perspective,
there is an Indian tendency to regard the region as a former
colony of Indian civilization, a view based on a distorted
understanding of the spread of Indian culture in that area in
pre-modern times. In Indonesia, there is a view amongst a
minority that India may become a more direct threat than China
which at the present time lacks a naval air capability, of the
46
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kind possessed by India, which would be necessary to enforce
its claim within the region. 48
48
. Kreisberd, P., Op. Cit. p. 16
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VI. THREATS TO THE ASEAN
A. CAMBODIAN CONFLICT
The Cambodian conflict is in many ways typical of the
conflicts that characterize developing regions. At the
beginning, the conflict was bilateral (Khmer- Vietnamese) and
domestic (Intra-Khmer) , but became internationalized by the
dynamics of deep-seated Thai -Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese
antagonism, as well as global Sino- Soviet and Soviet -American
rivalries
.
In ASEAN' s view, Vietnam's invasion and occupation of
Cambodia violated two of its cardinal security norms: non-
interference and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of
another country, and the non-use of force to resolve political
disputes. The ASEAN has consistently and strongly deplored
Hanoi's intervention and reaffirmed the right of the Cambodian
people to self-determination. Thailand viewed the invasion and
occupation by the Vietnamese of Cambodia as a threat to its
national security.
The ASEAN as a regional organization could not have
prevented the Vietnamese invasion even if it had anticipated
Hanoi's action. It nevertheless played a major role in the
conflict's containment and final termination. The ASEAN may
not have had a collective self-defense arrangement capable of
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meeting the advancing Vietnamese, but it used its collective
coercive diplomacy to implement the terms of the declaration
of a July 1981 ASEAN- initiated, U.N. -sponsored International
Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) . That declaration called for a
total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia,
emphasized the right of the Cambodian people to self-
determination, and stressed the need for Cambodia to remain
non-aligned in order to safeguard the legitimate security
concerns of its neighboring states. The declaration was sought
to deny the victory of Vietnam in Cambodia and to prevent the
spread of the conflict to other ASEAN states, especially
Thailand. The ASEAN sought to terminate the conflict through
a combination of political -diplomatic, economical and military
pressure that made the costs of dominance in Cambodia
unbearably high for Hanoi.
It should be noted that the agreement signed in Paris in
October 1991 is a settlement and not a resolution of the
intra-Khmer and Vietnamese -Khmer dimension of the conflict.
The deep distrust among the four Khmer factions, and the
animosity between the Cambodians (especially the Khmer Rouge)
and the Vietnamese remain unaltered. In other words, there has
been no significant change in the goals, attitudes and
perceptions of these parties. There is a possibility that the
conflict could be reignited of some point in the future, if
the U.N. -supervised elections fail to produce a stable
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government. The intra-Khmer conflict might also resurface and
intensify.
The aggressive diplomatic efforts of the ASEAN and the
plan to include the other nations of Indochina within the
ASEAN, albeit with only observer status until they demonstrate
sufficient political maturity, 49 this will enable the ASEAN to
be politically involved and to intervene in any conflict that
may erupt.
B. THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
The Spratly group of islands is located in the southern
part of the South China Sea, 3 00 nautical miles (nml) west of
the Philippine island of Palawan, 300 nml east of Vietnam and
650 nml south of Hainan (China) . They consist of over 230
islets, reefs, shoals and sand banks. The total land area is
about 250,000 square kilometers
.
(Enclosure F) The disputes
over these islands involve China, Taiwan, Vietnam and three
ASEAN countries (the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei). The
claims of the ASEAN members differ from the rest in a
significant ways. First, the ASEAN parties in the disputes do
not claim the entire Spratly chain, but only certain islands.
The Philippines has the largest claim, totaling some 60
islets, which they collectively call the Kalayaan Islands.
49
. Wanandi, Jusuf, "Asia- Pacific Security Forum:
Rationale and Options from the ASEAN Perspedtive" , Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D. C. 1993, pp.
8-10
65
Malaysia claims three islands and four groups of rocks, while
Brunei only claims the Louisa Reef. Both the Philippines and
Malaysia have established a military presence in their
respective claimed islands. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan have
also stationed sizeable military forces in the islands they
claim.
Economically, the Spratlys are believed to be rich in oil
and other minerals, such as manganese modules, as well as
fishing grounds. Strategically, the islands are located near
major sea-lanes in eastern Asia which carry about 90% of
Japan's oil. During World War II, the Spratlys were used by
the Japanese Navy as a submarine base and staging area for its
operations on Malaya and the archipilagic Southeast Asia: the
Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. Control of the island
group could provide a country with a staging points for
surveillance, sea-lane interdiction, and other naval
operations that could disrupt traffic from Singapore to
southern China and Taiwan.
Despite the strategic and probable economic importance of
the islands and the military presence of the disputing
parties, all have openly expressed their intentions to
settling the dispute on the Spratly Islands through peaceful
and diplomatic means. The ASEAN has proposed the creation of
a "Spratly Authority" to handle issues that will arise on
these contested islands.
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C. OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Cooperation and harmony among the ASEAN nations has
prospered since its formation in 1967. However, the absence of
a real superpower to impose the Association's decisions has
greatly affected the effectiveness of the ASEAN. This was
demonstrated when the Association's efforts on the Cambodian
issue was only realized alter the great powers and the UN
recognized and participated in the conflict resolution. The
existence of a six-nation organization in a sub-portion of a
vast area of the Asia- Pacific region may pose the danger of
its being absorbed by a larger organization in the area.
The Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was launched
in 1984. It consists of powerful nations like the United
States, Canada, Japan, Australia and the three Chinese
economies (PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong) , which could easily
overturn whatever decision the ASEAN states (also members of
APEC) might want to impose. This was shown when Malaysia's
Prime Minister Mahatir recommended an regional economic
grouping in the area without the United States. This was
immediately objected to by Japan.
Malaysia and Singapore, who are members of the of the
Five -Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) , which includes the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, are supposed to
consult with the other members before deciding on security and
political issues. The ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference or
ASEAN- PMC has expanded the ASEAN to included the United
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States, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and
the European Community (EC) . It can also alter whatever
resolution the Association might decide.
In November of 1993, the United States hosted in Seattle,
Washington, an unprecedented meeting of leaders from 15
Pacific Rim economies, including China, Taiwan, Japan and
Australia to an "informal meeting" called the First Asia-
Pacific summit. This informal summit was supposed to focus on
economic issues and to further trade liberalization in the
region. Like the APEC, this conference is expected to be held
annually. The Asia- Pacific summit could also pose a threat to
the effectiveness of the ASEAN. This forum will be looking at
the interest of the whole Asia- Pacific Rim which could be
contrary to the interests of the ASEAN.
D. RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS, COMMUNIST INSURGENTS AND RACIAL
PROBLEMS
The role of religious extremism as a threat to regime and
regional stability in ASEAN focuses on the political influence
of Islam. The role of Islam, like that of ethnicity, varies
widely within the region. This is partly due to the uneven
distribution of the Muslim population which constitutes a
majority in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, but only 5% of the
population in Thailand, 7% in the Philippines and 17% in
Singapore. But in the recent years, signs of an Islamic
resurgence and the rise of extreme religious fundamentalism
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have been evident not only in the Middle East but also in most
of the ASEAN countries. Separatist movements in some ASEAN
countries like the Philippines, and Thailand could be
attributed to the Muslim extremists.
In the Philippines, the Muslim secessionist movement under
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has been active in
recent years and has demanded greater autonomy in the island
of Mindanao. There is a deadlock in the negotiations, because
the demand for an autonomous Mindanao is opposed by the
majority of the population of the island, who are
predominantly Christians. The government cannot give in to
some of the unreasonable demands of hard-line Muslim
extremists
.
In Thailand, however, separatists among the Muslim
population of southern Thailand have been reduced
significantly as a result of security cooperation between Thai
and Malaysian forces. There has also been greater sensitivity
on the part of the Thai government to Muslim demands for the
preservation of their unique identity.
The most encouraging development in the ASEAN region is
the decline of communism as a revolutionary political force.
"With the exception of the Philippines, communist insurgents
no longer pose a credible threat to regime survival in ASEAN
states. The governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand
have prevailed over local communist parties which once enjoyed
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a considerable following. 50 Though the communist struggle has
always been "protracted" and the possibility of a communist
revival still exists, because of the global collapse of
communism chances are that the communist threat in the ASEAN
will eventually diminish.
The threat of communism in the ASEAN was best described in
the statement of Singapore former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew:
The future that China once envisaged of fraternal
communist parties taking over control of ASEAN countries
was, and is, too simplistic... None of the ASEAN
countries has any need for communism or communist parties
to bring about a better society and a better economic life
for its people.
There are also some racial problems in the region.
Communal ism tends to erode the multi-racial harmony because it
is inclined to create segregation and discrimination in some
ASEAN nations. Malaysia and Singapore with a delicate mix of
Malay and Chinese in their population, have a tendency to
erupt into racial clashes if their respective governments fail
to handle it properly. This is what happened in the Malaysian
and Singapore Chinese riots in 1959 and 1961.
E. OTHER INTRA- REGIONAL CONFLICTS
One measure of the success enjoyed by the ASEAN as a
regional organization is the prevention of armed conflicts
between neighboring members on border issues. The unclear
borders created by the various colonial powers that once
50
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dominated the region have caused various internal problems
among the ASEAN states. The detailed causes and resolutions of
these border disputes is a study by itself and, therefore,
this author will just mention some of the significant issues
and briefly describe each conflict. It should be noted that in
most border disputes, Malaysia being at the center of the
region is always involved.
1. Malaysia and Singapore
Malaysia and Singapore are engaged in a dispute over
the rock called the Pedra Branca Island by Singapore, and Bato
Putih White Rock by the Malaysians. This is an island off the
coast of Johor. It is about 55 Kilometers northeast of
Singapore and houses the British-built Horsburg lighthouse as
well as a radar station. Singapore claims it on the basis of
control exercised since the 1840s, while Malaysia claims that
the island belongs to the state of Johor. Both countries have
agreed in principle to settle the dispute through diplomatic
channels and exchanges of documents but the negotiations have
dragged over on the past ten years. This issue has allowed the
Malaysian opposition party Parti Islam (PAS) to score points
at the expense of the ruling party National Front
Government . 51
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2. Malaysia and the Philippines
The dispute over Sabah in North Borneo, was once
regarded as the most dangerous bilateral dispute within ASEAN.
The Philippines has shown documents that Sabah was leased to
the Sultan of Sulo (a Sultanate in the Southern Philippines)
by the British in the early 1900s. In fact, to the present,
the Sultan of Sulo is still receiving compensation from the
lease. Malaysia claimed that Sabah was bought from the Sultan
by the British and not leased as claimed by the Philippines.
The case was recommended by the Philippines for elevation to
the World Court, but Malaysia refuses to permit the issue to
be decided by the world body. Armed confrontations almost
erupted between the two countries in 1966 had it not been for
the decisive efforts of the ASEAN, particularly Thailand. The
issue is now considerably muted since the Philippines dropped
the claim at the 19 77 ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, but it has
not been formally abandoned. However, the official visit of
the Malaysian Prime Minister to the Philippines in February
1994, is a healthy sign that the issue is not of importance.
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VII. ALTERNATIVES AND OPTIONS
The ASEAN has three options or alternatives it may pursue
in order to adapt the Association to the dynamics of the
international world order in general and the region in
particular. First is to strengthen the Association, expand the
membership, and organize it into a collective self-defense
organization with a standing military arm to enforce its
decisions and insure security and stability within the region.
Second, is to maintain the status quo. Let the Association
keep its original objective of co-operation solely for
economic, social and cultural purpose. The third option is for
the organization to merge with larger organizations like the
ASPAC, the First Asia- Pacific Summit or another association in
the Asia- Pacific region which includes powerful and
economically advanced nations.
The first option, to expand its membership and
strengthening the ASEAN with a military arm, has shown its
effectiveness when the Association as a singular force
convinced the UN Security Council to resolve the Cambodian
problem when there was a direct threat to the security of one
of its members, Thailand. This forced Vietnam to withdraw its
occupation of the country. The security and stability of the
region depended on the developments in Cambodia. This was one
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common interest and concern among the ASEAN states. The
increasing refugee problem, the fear of the Cambodian conflict
spilling over into Thailand, and apprehension over Vietnamese
intentions in the region forced the ASEAN to act decisively
and act as one to resolve these crises. The common threats and
common interests existing among its members compelled the
ASEAN to behave unilaterally. But without such commonality,
can the ASEAN be expected to act in a similar fashion?
It should be noted that there is a gap in the pace of
economic development within the ASEAN nations and a much wider
disparity if the non-member countries of Indochina were
included in the ASEAN. These economic differences causes the
ASEAN nations to pursue various interests. The economies of
the member nations of the ASEAN are one of the major factors
that will determine the objectives of the organization.
Within the Southeast Asian region, which includes
Indochina, there exists two completely different ideologies,
communism and capitalism. This factor will affect the future
of ASEAN membership. Of the five remaining communist countries
in the world, two are in Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Laos) .
While North Korea and China are within East Asia and exert
great influence on the path the nations of Southeast Asia may
choose to pursue.
Among the ASEAN states, there are various differences in
the priorities and the national interests of the different
member nations. Singapore depends heavily one international
74
trade to maintain its economy and insists on the presence of
the great powers in the region, like the United States, for
the protection of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and
maintenance of regional stability. Indonesia and Malaysia, on
the other hand, believe that the region should be free from
super powers influence in accordance to the ASEAN principle of
ZOPFAN. Thailand has focused its attention on Indochina as a
market for its products, with the ambition of making Bangkok
the center of Indochina. The Philippines, the only nation of
the ASEAN which has remained economically slow, is still
concerned with its internal problems. While Brunei, like
Singapore, has to depend on the outside powers for its
external security.
With these diverse interests and preferences of the ASEAN
member states, and the contrasting economic positions of the
various countries in Southeast Asia, it is very unlikely that
the Association will expand and form into a collective self-
defense arrangement. Each country is concerned with the
development of its economy. At present, no nation in the
region has the resources nor the interest to organize a
standing force.
Regarding the second option, for the ASEAN to maintain its
status quo, the changes in the international order and the
dynamics of regional conditions, have made it impossible for
the organization to isolate itself from international
political involvement. The involvement of the ASEAN in the
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Cambodian conflict and its dependence on the Security Council
and the superpowers for its resolution has shown that the
ASEAN must involve the Association for crisis resolution
pupposes and that it must invite external actors to the region
to assist in certain conflict settlements. The ASEAN,
therefore, cannot remain passive and isolated from the
realities of the politically complex international order.
Economic and cultural collaboration is intertwined with
political , and often military, participation.
The last option, which is for the ASEAN to disintegrate
and merge its member nations, individually into larger
organizations in the area, should be the last thing that the
ASEAN might do. The ASEAN as an organization should join
larger organizations as one and with a single unilateral
voice. With a solid and a unified stand, the Association would
be in a better position to be heard at the bargaining table





ASEAN had its beginning as a diplomatic mechanism for
subregional reconciliation. Initially conceived for economic
co-operation, it has gradually evolved into an organization of
political and security co-operation going beyond the bounds of
its member nations. Though the membership has expanded only
gradually since its formation in 1967, from five to six
members, its corporate identity has been recognized as an
international actor.
However, as a regional organization has it been effective
as it should be? Some consider the Association to be
successful, since no armed conflict has erupted within the
ASEAN since its creation. Others believe that it could do
more. As one political analyst wrote, "Unless ASEAN and other
interested parties move beyond the dialogue of a dining club
and begin focusing on concrete action, the challenges to
regional security will go unmet". 52 The optimism generated by
the end of the Cold War for regional stability and the US-Sino
and Sino-Soviet rivalries has substantially been eroded. While
the possibility of a major armed international conflict in
Southeast Asia may seem remote at the moment, strategic
uncertainties and potential flashpoints abound. Certainly, no
ASEAN leader is optimistic about the changing regional balance
52 Acharya, A., Op. Cit., P. 74
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of power, even if none can point to any clear external threat
to regional security.
The ASEAN may be described as one of the more successful
regional organizations in the world, but it cannot isolate
itself from the political realities of the changing times. The
goals of the founding fathers of the Association to free the
region from external powers and for the organization to remain
as an economic block cannot be possible without security and
defense agreements. As shown in the containment and
termination of the Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN as a regional
organization was a major actor in the final conflict
resolution. The potential strength of the ASEAN can be used to
balance any threat from any external superpower. Even with the
ideological differences among the other Southeast Asian
nations, like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, the ASEAN
leaders should find ways to harness these economically
strapped nations which could be beneficial to the Association.
A defense community may not be possible at the moment or
in the foreseeable future among the ASEAN members. Aside from
the astronomical cost of a standing regional force, there is
diversity in their interests, and in their cultural,
historical, and ideological experiences. There is also uneven
economic development and varying threat perceptions among its
members. At present there is no nation among the ASEAN who
would be willing to contribute men and material, even if they
have these resources, in defense of another member state. With
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their different priorities, their resources are much more
needed in their economic development.
With the end of the Cold War, and the continued
disappearance of the communist threat, a collective self-
defense or a military alliance may not be necessary at the
moment. On the other hand, strengthening the Association as a
security community to include non-ASEAN nations will assure
that no member will resort to the use of force in settling
disputes. This will guarantee the much needed stability and
security of the region. The ASEAN has shown its identity in
the international scene. With a more cohesive Southeast Asian
organization and stronger solidarity, the ASEAN will be in a
better bargaining position vis-a-vis other external actors. It
is in its diplomatic role that the ASEAN has assumed a
corporate identity. Only with harmonious relationships with
the rest of the Southeast Asia nations can the ASEAN succeed
as a regional organization and attain an atmosphere of
relative security and stability.
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Enclosure: C
U. S. Two-Way Trade, 1967-1991
U.S. TWO-WAY TRADE, 1967 AND 1991













Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Census,
U.S. Deoartment of Commerce
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Enclosure: D
Phased U. S. Troop Reductions
PHASED TROOP REDUCTIONS
1990 Phase I Phase II 1995
Country Starting Reductions Philippines 1993 Reductions Strength
Service Stength 1990-1992 Withdrawal Strength 1992-1995 (Approximate)
j
JAPAN 50.000 4,773 45.227 700 44,527
Armv Personnel 2.000 22 1,978 1,978
|
Navv Shore-based 7,000 502 6,498
1
Marines 25,000 3.489 21,511 21^11
Air Force lb.OOO 560 15,440 700 14,740
Joint billets 200
KOREA 44,400 6.987 37,413 6500* 30,913*
Armv Personnel 32.000 5,000 27,000 27,000
Navv Shore-based 400 400 400
Marines 500 500 500
Air Force 11,500 1,987 9,513 9,513
PHILIPPINES 14.800 3.490 1U10
Armv Personnel 200 200 relocated
Navy Shore-based 5,000 672 4,328 elsewhere










25,800 "afloat or otfi erwise forward deployed."
'Korean troop redu<:tions deferred in light of North Korean threat.







YEAR US JAPAN TOTAL US% JAPAN% salaries
1984 2.276 2,038
i
4,314 Do /o 47 %
1965 2,552 2,134 4,686 54 % 46 %
1986 2,184 5,461 60 % 40 %
1987 3,759 2,431 6,190 61 % "50 0/Os /O
1988 4,521 3,260 7,781 Do % A*) O'
1989 4,391 5,085 7,476 59 % •si /o 54.5 %
1990 3,500 2,900 6,400 DD /o 63.0 %
1991 4,000 3,300 7,300 55 % / r o/ 62.C %
1992 3,800 3,500 7,300 52% /If O'TO /O 65.0 %
3,650 3,650 7,300 50 % 50 % 66.0 %
1994 3,500 3,800 7,300 AQ. °' 52% 71.0%
ioc=;
-. s S *1 3,550 3,950 7,300 a r o/ 54 % 74.0 %
Unit=Sl million 1991-2 995 figures are estimates
Notes:
1992-1995 are estimates based on 199] stationing cost data and a yen rare of * 154/5.
U.S. costs include non-appropriated fund labor costs and are based on US fiscal year.
GO! host nation support includes non-budgeted categones and is based on JFY. which i> six month*
later than US fiscal year.
1992-95 cost sharing estimates based on GOJ budget projection for labor and utilities contrinutions.
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